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A commentary on
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Despite the importance of exploratory data analysis (EDA) in statistics and science, few people
have worked on its philosophical foundations. In psychology, the present author (Haig, 2012;
Behrens et al., 2013) have commented on philosophical aspects of EDA. They hold contrasting
views about the appropriateness of abductive reasoning as a core component of the philosophy of
EDA. Behrens and his co-authors think that abduction provides the “core logic” of EDA. I disagree.
In this commentary, I say why I think their position is mistaken, and that their charge that mine is
“a particularly disturbing” view of EDA is unfounded.
Abduction as a form of inference is not well-known in academic circles. Broadly speaking,
abduction is concerned with the generation and evaluation of explanatory hypotheses. In this
sense, it contrasts with the more familiar ideas of inductive and deductive inference. Behrens et al.
begin by taking their cue from Charles Peirce, and state that abduction is the form of inference
involved in generating new ideas or hypotheses. However, surprisingly, Behrens et al. then elect to
follow Josephson and Josephson (1994), and characterize abductive inference with the following
pattern of reasoning (p. 39):
D is a collection of data (facts, observations, givens).
Hypothesis H explains D (would if true, explain D).
No other hypothesis explains D as well as H does.
Therefore, H is probably correct.
Patently, this argument schema does not describe the abductive process of hypothesis generation.
Instead, it characterizes the abductive form of reasoning known as inference to the best explanation.
Inference to the best explanation is used in science to appraise competing theories in terms of their
explanatory goodness (Thagard, 1992). In order for the schema to capture abductive hypothesis
generation, the third premise, which refers to competing hypotheses, would have to be deleted, and
the conclusion would be amended to say that the hypothesis in question was initially plausible, not
probably correct.
It is important to differentiate between the abductive generation of hypotheses, and their
comparative appraisal in terms of inference to the best explanation. They are discernably different
phases of theory construction. By choosing inference to the best explanation, Behrens et al. adopt a
conception of abduction that is ill-suited to explicating the process of idea generation, whether it is
pattern identification through EDA, or some other generative process. As a result, they fail to make
an instructive connection between their chosen characterization of abduction and the reasoning
involved in EDA.
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However, my major worry is not that Behrens et al. choose
the wrong form of abduction to explicate the inferential nature of
EDA, but that they try to understand it by appealing to abduction
at all. The fundamental difference between our opposed views
can be brought out by drawing, and adhering to, the important
three-fold methodological distinction between data, phenomena,
and explanatory theory. Briefly, data are idiosyncratic to
particular investigative contexts, and they provide the evidence
for phenomena, which are recurrent general features of the world
that we seek to explain. In turn, phenomena are the appropriate
source of evidence for the explanatory theories that we construct
in order to understand empirical phenomena. In Haig (2005,
2014) I described one way of detecting phenomena by outlining
a multistage model of data analysis. These stages of data analysis
are concerned in turn with assessing data quality, detecting data
patterns, confirming those patterns through use of computer
resampling methods (a prominent feature of Tukey’s conception
of data analysis), and establishing the reach of the confirmed
relationships in the form of inductive generalizations. Viewed in
this context, EDA is an empirical, descriptive, pattern detection
process. It is one component in a sequence of activities which,
if undertaken successfully, can lead to the detection of new
empirical phenomena.
Once claims about empirical phenomena are established, there
is a natural press to understand them by constructing one or
more explanatory theories. It is here, and not with the process
of phenomena detection, that abduction does its work. Again,
in Haig (2005, 2014) I argue how by different abductive means,
one can generate explanatory theories, develop them through
analogical modeling, and evaluate them in relation to their rivals
in terms of inference to the best explanation. Importantly, the
means I choose for showing this are, in turn, the abductive
methods of exploratory factor analysis, analogical abduction,
and the theory of explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1992). As
methods, they provide rich abductive resources that enable
researchers to produce explanatory knowledge. They well-exceed
the rudimentary account of abduction provided by the above
argument schema for inference to the best explanation.
Behrens et al. speak of generating hypotheses in the context
of EDA. In this regard, they pose questions about things such as
skewness and partialling-out. Of course, these sorts of questions
can be framed as hypotheses but they are descriptive hypotheses,
not explanatory hypotheses. They are hypotheses about data
analytic matters; they are not explanations of the data patters that
result from exploratory data analytic work.
The collected works of John W. Tukey (Vols. III and IV; Jones,
1986) provide valuable information about Tukey’s wide-ranging
philosophy of data analysis, including EDA. In Haig (2012), I
advocate an essentially Tukeyan philosophy of data analysis. This
may surprise Behrens et al., who see my philosophy as opposed
to Tukey’s. However, I see no tension, let alone contradiction, in
subscribing to large parts of Tukey’s perspective on data analysis
on the one hand, and advocating a thoroughgoing abductive
perspective on theory construction on the other. This is made
possible by taking the compendium of exploratory data analytic
methods as true to their name (they are data analytic methods),
and abductive methods as true to their name (they are methods
concerned with the construction of explanatory hypotheses and
theories).
If researchers were to follow Behrens et al. and characterize
EDA as fundamentally abductive in nature, they would risk
construing descriptive hypotheses as explanatory hypotheses,
when they had done no explanatory work at all. Better to put
abduction to one side, and follow Tukey’s philosophy of EDA.
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